Scholars have drawn on the rich literature on narrative in their research into the American trial, a perspective at least implicitly endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in the Old Chief case. This is all to the good. However, the real power of the "narrative approach" emerges when one thinks concretely about what is distinctive to the different kinds of narrative employed at trial. This article explores the rhetorical and epistemological significance of trial narrative in the full context of the "consciously structured hybrid" of language practices that make up the American trial. Such a perspective enables us to admire a well-tried case as realizing practical truths beyond story-telling.
differences in trial practices within the common law tradition, though they are relatively less significant that the differences between common law trials and "inquisitorial" procedures. Although the trial is an important institution in all common law countries, one may argue about whether the history and subsequent "spirit of the laws" of one or other country makes the trial more or less central. One can also imagine a continuum with the American trial at one extreme, British trial procedure near it, and continental versions farther along. Though the greater availability of the jury, especially in civil cases, in America is a feature of these differences, it is not itself the focus of my argument. I focus on the trial's linguistic practices and the constitutive rules that surround them. Though I am wary asking what is "essential" to the common law trial, let me mention some important features. Common law trials involve a relatively greater control by the parties over what evidence is presented and perhaps more importantly, how it is presented, and thus, implicitly, greater control over the range of social norms and common sense judgments which the party may invoke. Common law trials create a tension between the parties' "theories of the case," narratives designed to embody powerful social norms, including those not explicitly appearing in the law as written, and the almost obsessively detailed presentation of evidence of events in question. In the American version, this "theory of the case" is explicitly presented in opening statement, but it is also present implicitly, as I understand it, even in the Scottish version (which does not employ opening statement) where it appears incrementally in the parties witness examinations, both direct and cross, and then explicitly in summation. Though the "law of rules" is important to the structure of the common law trial in a number of ways, it does not provide the only social norms at play in the trial.
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Depending on one's perspective, one can describe the whole range of common law trials as more individualist, more political, more democratic, more empiricist, more egalitarian, more dramatic or theatrical, and more adversarial than their continental cousins. Likewise they can be described as less authoritarian, less statist, less rationalist, less normatively coherent, and less professional. Which form of trial is better? In a recent exchange with Lindsay Farmer, 6 I argued that one can begin to compare the relative strengths of trials only in relation to the societies in which they have their places.
The "right" trial for a more traditional, hierarchical, and organic society will be different from the "right" trial for a more market-based, egalitarian, and individualist society.
With the exception of features of the trial that are responsive to fully universal norms, formalistic and is anti-bureaucratic and so the trial is an important bulwark for us against the often bureaucratic "onslaught of modernity." 11 What the common law trial allows is 10 This phrase occasioned quite a bit of consternation and discussion at the Sterling Conference. This was understandable in that I have gone on for hundreds of pages about trial decision-making. What is "indescribable," I think, is the subjective "grasp" (note the physicalist metaphor) in the individual case of the right way to go forward. One can identify all the elements of the rules and practices of the trial, what I call the objective side of the trial event, to which the jury responds. One can identify the cognitive operations of which the jury would have to be capable in order to get it right. One can give increasingly adequate philosophical accounts of those operations. In an individual case, one can provide reasons defending the chosen resolution of the factual and normative issues. But this subjective grasp seems to require an integration of incommensurable factual, legal, moral, and political considerations unique to the case, "too fine to avail separately, too circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms." If the trier of fact can "get it right," it will not be because the result necessarily or deductively flows from any inevitably general descriptions of features of the case. The philosophical tradition contains many attempts to explain the "practical holism" that this account suggests. Those attempts are themselves inevitably hermeneutical in that they rely on "the mutual support of many considerations, of everything filling together into one coherent view" that does not compel assent. See R. Burns, A Theory of the Trial, 4-5, 201-219. See also P.
Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
a practical judgment of the relative importance of the moral, political, and formal legal aspects of the case, again, not generally, but in the very specific context of the facts of the individual case. One of the tensions within which the mind of the jury dwells is the tension between formal legality-"closeness of fit" with the legal rules-and the other dimensions of the case. The importance of that tension is, more narrowly, that it keeps the law from ossifying into a rigid ballet of bloodless categories. More broadly, it allows us moderns to renew our society after the passing away of any Archimedian point from which the entire society may be criticized at once--whether Absolute Knowledge, a politically dispositive Categorical Imperative or Divine Revelation, or a "scientific"
understanding of the interests of the Universal Class. Instead, the common law trial is one of the places we moderns can do what we need to do, "less to create constantly new forms of life than to creatively renew actual forms by taking advantage of their internal multiplicity and tensions with one another."
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These are enormous claims, and I will not be able to provide all the evidence for all of them here. What I will do, however, is to show how the narrative structure of the trial is of a piece with the interpretation of the trial I have offered. The general structure of the trial is familiar. The common law trial begins not with the evidence, but with opening statement. Here the lawyers are permitted to tell the jury what the evidence will show, not merely provide a preview of what the actual evidence will be. Significantly, he may narrate, but he may not argue. The party with the burden of proof then will present his evidence, mainly in the form of a series of direct examinations of his witnesses. The direct examinations will require the witness to answer nonleading questions and testify "in the language of perception," that is, in the main, recount what he did and what he saw. They will typically be structured in the form of description followed by chronological narration and will force the mind of the jury down to the details of the events recounted. Witnesses will be limited to the "representative" function of language:
they will typically not be permitted to make promises (not to do it again), give advice (how to rule in the case), or provide overt interpretations of the behavior they recount (what was on the perpetrator's mind when he acted.) Each witness will be subject to cross examination, which will interrupt the flow of direct examinations and force the jury to see the evidence from a contrary point of view. When the party with the burden of proof rests, then the opposing party will present its evidence, itself interrupted by cross examination. The party with the burden of proof may offer rebuttal testimony. The parties will offer closing argument, the jury instructions will be read, and the case will be submitted to the jury.
The Orthodox Interpretation: The Received View of the Trial
Let me present first the outlines of what I take to be an orthodox understanding of the trial, what I call the "received view of the trial." Within this view, which I take not so much to be wrong as to be woefully partial, the trial is the institutional device for realizing the rule of law where there are disputes of fact. The goal of trial procedure, including the law of evidence, is to allow the jury 13 to engage in a three-step process: (1)
to construct an accurate, value-free account of what occurred, (2)to engage in an act of what might be called "fair categorization," by which it determines whether the value free account previously constructed fairly fits within the categories defined by the substantive law and found concretely in the jury instructions, and finally (3)announce a verdict that emerges solely from the inspection of the conclusions reached at stage (2) to determine whether the party with the burden of proof has established by the legally defined standard ("preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt") each of the elements of the crime, claim, or affirmative defense. In this view, the construction of a value-free and accurate account of what happened is the result of common-sense reasoning, common sense being conceived as a "web of belief" containing value-free empirical generalizations about probabilities connecting bits of circumstantial evidence to "material" factual conclusions. It is important that this account be value-free so that the only source of norms to enter the trial flow from the law embedded in the jury instructions, itself legitimized somewhat differently in natural law and positivist traditions. The rule of law should be the law of rules. 14 Put less charitably, it is a form of "mechanical jurisprudence" at the trial level.
The received view has power. It explains a good deal of what actually goes on in common law trials, their most distinctive features. In particular, it explains the central 13 For ease of reference, I will refer to "the trier of fact" as the "jury." The social scientific literature suggests that judges and juries reach the same conclusions in the significant majority of cases. Not much turns on the distinction for purposes of the account I provide.
evidentiary doctrine of "materiality," a doctrine that requires that each bit of evidence have a pedigree, or "warrant," that connects it up though an empirical generalization found usually in common sense, though sometimes in science, with a fact that is "of consequence," that is, which the substantive law declares to be of significance. It also in part explains the pervasive preference of the common law of evidence for testimony in the language of perception by witnesses who themselves have had perceptual experience of the matter to which they would testify. The received view is also connected with important political ideals, specifically with justice as regularity, the notion that legal Justification of this mode of decision making has both descriptive and normative elements. The task of understanding the trial is an interpretive task and it "is partly evaluative, since it consists in the identification of the principles which both best 'fit' or cohere with the settled law and legal practices of a legal system and also provide the best moral justification for them, thus showing the law 'in its best light.'" 15 So yes, for us, the best form of trial is one where the values that the received view of the trial celebrates are
represented, but are in a harsh and demanding tension with other important values.
The Rhetorical Dimension of the Trial
My focus here will be on the narrative structure of the trial, how it proceeds by the construction and deconstruction of narrative, of different sorts of narratives. That is itself a partial perspective. To appreciate the trial fully, it is also necessary to appreciate a range of other characteristics that are so basic that their significance can easily be missed.
The trial is spoken; it proceeds through time; it is a sort of drama; it is a rhetorical situation. Each of these features has significance. that is allowed to emerge within them. Rhetoricians' "commonplaces"-multiple sources for arguments-have always understood the multiplicity of the sources of "persuasives."
We don't only "use" rhetoric to achieve goals instrumentally, our norms and so our identity are constituted rhetorically, in disputing the relative importance of multiple norms for a highly specific situation-that is how we decide "who we are." Negatively, this suggests the limitations of the received view, especially when one considers, for example, an engrossing two-week trial, followed by the reading for twenty minutes of (often unintelligible) jury instructions. Decision in rhetorical situations stems from a tacit response to a situation in which one is engrossed. This engrossing rhetorical situation is the trial itself, a "consciously structured hybrid of languages" which determines the kind of truth that can emerge under uncertainty for a practical purpose. Now, to the ears of a certain sort of analytic philosopher, the "rhetorical" nature of the trial may suggest the conclusion that the mode of thought at work at trial is irrational, or worse. After all, doesn't rhetoric have "savage roots," doesn't it inhabit the "world of the lie," isn't it "a weapon called upon to gain victory in battles where the decision hung on the spoken word," isn't it always "possible for the art of 'saying it well'
to la y aside all concern for 'speaking the truth'"? 20 At the very least, doesn't the rhetorical dimension of the trial suggest that decisions made there are "emotional" or based on "sentiment." Though I cannot make the argument here at length, the constitutive rules of the trial, the rules of court procedure, evidence, and professional responsibility, seek to maintain the energy that comes from rhetoric's primitive roots (and so protect us from the dead weight of bureaucratic lethargy) while structuring that energy to a productive tension of opposites. I will say more about that it a moment. For now, the rhetorical nature of the trial should make us suspect that the received view of the trial cannot quite be true, that there is more in play than accurate fact-finding followed by fair received view's notion of judgment suggests. 21 My view is that this broader range of responses allows the juror to capture more of the human truth of the situation before him:
Emotions can sometimes mislead and distort judgment; Aristotle is aware of this. But they can also…give us access to a truer and deeper level of ourselves, to values and commitments that have been concealed by defensive ambition or rationalization.
But even this is, so far, too Platonic a line to take: for it suggests that emotion is valuable only as an instrumental means to a purely intellectual state. We know, however, that for Aristotle appropriate responses…can, like good intellectual responses, help to constitute the refined "perception" which is the best sort of human judgment. 22 The perception that is created by the trial's "consciously structured hybrid of languages" relies 23 not only on feeling, but on what one theorist has called political wisdom:
Taken as a whole, this composite type of knowledge represents a contrast with the scientific type. Its mode of activity is not so much the style of the search as of reflection. It is mindful of logic, but more so of the incoherence and contradictoriness of experience. And for the same reason, it is distrustful of rigor. Political life does not yield its significance to terse hypotheses but is elusive, and hence meaningful statements about it often have to be allusive and imitative. Context becomes supremely important, for actions and events occur in no other setting. Knowledge of this type tends, therefore, to be suggestive and illuminative rather than explicit and determine. 23 More precisely, the trial's languages not only rely on these capacities, but, in a strong sense, realize them.
The Centrality of Narrative at Trial: A Preliminary Summary
We will see shortly that the kind of narrative that is available in opening statement is quite different from the kinds of narrative that pervade the evidentiary phase of the trial. One may distinguish provisionally (1) circumcumstantial evidence 27 from (2) a "bare" or "purely perceptual" account of events 28 constructed from such evidence from (3) a fully characterized, or interpreted narrative of events, such as the kind of story told in opening statements. In the common law trial, the jury starts with the third and then moves to the first and second in order to decide between the two narratives presented.
The notion of a "bare narrative" is derived from one sort of question the jury will naturally ask in deciding which of the opening statements proves to be the more adequate. That question is basically, "What would you have seen had you been there?"
But even in the best prepared cases even the bare narrative will be underdetermined by the circumstantial evidence presented. Often common sense will not be able to reliably defendant's words an "accusation" or a "threat?") Since, as we will see, the plausibility of the overall narrative is determined in part by its overall likelihood or probability as a factual matter, its consistency with the empirical generalizations are contained by common sense, these underdetermined factual issues of disputed characterization may be decided in part by their consistency or coherence with the more likely "bare narrative."
The lines of implication between the part and the whole run both ways, and those lines are lines both of meaning and of factual plausibility.
That is, however, only the first of the inevitably circular cognitive moveme nts even at the most basic factual level. Even when the nature of the circumstantial evidence is both complete and uncontested (almost never), that evidence is always linked to the episodes in the bare narrative by a common sense generalization 29 that provides its "logical relevance."
The jury will necessarily ask implicitly, "How universal is the commonsense generalization that links the circumstantial evidence to the episode in the bare narrative for which it is offered as proof?" Since the structure of the commonsense generalizations that provide those links is always, "Generally and for the most part…" the next question is always "Are all the particular additional facts in this case (F1…..Fn)such as to make the generalization more or less powerful than it would be, all other things being equal?" But the existence of these latter facts (F1…..Fn) and their proper characterizations will themselves be in dispute just as is F1. And the strength of the commonsense generalizations that link those facts to wha t the proponent seeks to show is also caught in another web of mutually determining probabilities. processes. To borrow from Henry James, trial evidence is a kind of pudding, but it is a lumpy pudding.
More importantly, the stories that lawyers may tell in opening statement are highly constrained narratives, as we will see at greater length below. But this is not my main point here. The only point I want to make here is that the existence, proper description, and meaning of even the most basic of circumstantial evidence at trial is partly determined by its place in different levels of narrative. They will thus be partially judgment." 34 It is through narrative that we remember (re-me mber), and the internal characteristics of narrative, such as presence of extraneous details, can affect its plausibility even before any evidence is offered. We seem to have a natural "predisposition to organize experience into a narrative form into plot structures and the rest." 35 And, mercifully, this spontaneous tendency seems not to be a mere consoling artifice imposed on a featureless substrate, because narratives are "found … in the midst of experience and action, not in some higher level linguistic construction or reconstructions in the experiences and actions involved." 36 In short, stories "are told in being lived, and lived in being told." 37 Narrative structure demands of the story-teller a judgment of relative importance that eliminates the inessential. It is often through a wellcrafted story that one can show "things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest." 38 The internal morality of stories is highly contextual. Although whatever the law is after, it is not the whole truth. The legal terrain the parties were moving on contained what evidence scholars sometimes call "codified inferences," apparently factual inferences that had been mandated "as a matter of law." Thus, appellate courts had sanctioned the notion that prior child abuse was evidence that the abusor acted in the specific instance before the court with the knowledge that great bodily harm was likely to result from his actions (even though no such great bodily harm resulted on the previous occasions). This was actually a moral judgment impersonating a factual inference. Both advocates used language that appeared nowhere in the criminal code-words like "child" or "victim"or "madness"-but which had enormous power to define the meaning of the event being tried. 41 The ability of counsel to tell a fully characterized story in opening inevitably brings to play all of the normative resources embedded in the common sense of the community, its life-world. Aspects of the situation could be shown that could never in this context be said. The legal categories
were not ignored, indeed had to be respected, but there was much more at work in these apparently simple stories.
At trial there is not, of course, one opening statement, but two. As Hampshire "theory choice" that is fairer or wiser. As I noted above the two opening statements often talk by each other, since each is ur ging and , in a sense, "performing" the adequacy of the understanding that it urges, as well as the eligibility of the mode of social ordering appropriate to the interpretation of events it provides. Unlike standard narrative historiography, where there exists a single account of events that purports to be congruent with the single course of events it recounts, the duality of opening statements is in factual storytelling, and probably in fictional storytelling as well, is intimately related to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality, that is, to identify it with the social system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine." 48 "In this sense, narrative already belongs to the ethical field in virtue of its claim-inseparable from its narration-to ethical justice." 49 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle identified forensic rhetoric as concerned specifically with praise and blame, and argued that narrative was its distinctive medium.
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Thus each of the opening statements tells a story in which there is an implicit moral evaluation of persons and actions. The opening that presents the "more powerful norm" will offer the theme that is most likely to begin to win the battle for the jury's imagination, and to provide the central organizing principle for the interpretation of the levels of disputable fact that will appear in the evidentiary phase of the trial. 51 But the trial is not only about a judgment of personal morality. It is a public practice carried out within public institutions. Not only will the jury be making a moral judgment and defining its moral identity, 52 it will be making a political judgment and defining the 48 Ibid. Especially in criminal cases, which always involve the executive or police power of the state, the jury will decide whether the exercise of that power is consistent with their own political self-understanding. The opening statements thus have another performative function, a "signaling" as well has a "labeling" function. Each tries implicitly to offer to the jury a political self-understanding about the exercise of public authority to which he or she can give her public allegiance. As deTocqueville put it in his classic statement:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions. It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right. If these two elements be removed the love of independence becomes a mere destructive passion. It teaches men to practice equity; every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged….The jury teaches every man not to recoil before the responsibility of his own actions and impresses him with that manly confidence without which no political virtue can exist. It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards society and the party which they take in its government. By obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs than their own, it rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of society. An effective opening suggests that to reject the proponent's case is to diminish the public identity of the juror and the way of life with which it is intertwined. And so the trial will inevitably involve an act of public self-interpretation.
Of course, the trial does not end after opening statement. 55 The opening's strength, its ability to offer the full range of considerations and norms relevant to the meaning of the case can also be, from the perspective of justice, its weakness. Some of which may be beneath consciousness without losing their worth." 59 Judge Jack
Weinstein, a very prominent American trial judge and evidence scholar, put it this way, "The jury's evaluation of the evidence relevant to a material proposition requires a gestalt or synthesis of evidence which seldom needs to be analyzed precisely. Any item of evidence must be interpreted in the context of all the evidence…." In sum:
The capacity which leads courts so consistently to get it right is, I suggest, a specialization of a general cognitive ability that functions in somewhat different ways in both factual and normative investigations, and somewhat differently still in the combined normative-factual inquiry that is the trial. It is holistic and interpretive. It can grasp "the cumulations of probabilities…too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms." It is likely to "trust rather in the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected." The devices of the trial both supply innumerable such fibers and dramatize their possible connections in ways directly relevant to courts' tasks.
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Conclusion
What is distinctive about the narratives at trial is the way in which they are constrained and counterposed to increase the level of intellectual tension. The story-teller must anticipate his opponent's case. He must anticipate the evidence that will be presented, both because the opening statement is a promise, but also because of ethical rules that generally forbid assertion of fact for which there will be no evidence. All conspire to prevent the advocate from telling the most persuasive story regardless of its truth. 60 Burns, supra n.1, 210-11. The first quote is from John Henry Newman, the second from Charles event and in a legal context that usually requires an either-or judgment of liability. This demands a lower level of "subjunctivity" or indeterminacy of the key narrative elements-details are blurred in opening only if uncertainty about the evidence forces the advocate into that rhetorically unattractive posture. Each lawyer must respect the political truths and legally codified inferences that operate within the legal order. Each lawyer has the motive to emphasize precisely those facts and norms that the other cannot easily integrate into his factual theory and theme. The advocate must be concerned as well about the moral force of the jury instructions and, in civil cases, the possibility of a directed verdict or a new trial. These constraints pull the accounts toward each other, since they must anticipate the opponent's most powerful evidence and arguments; toward the evidence, because of the performative aspect of opening statement; and towards the written law. The factual theories of the case are themselves in tension with the narratives offered by the witnesses during their direct examinations, narratives that are, in their particularity, unlikely to be wholly subsumed by the factual theory and theme of even the most accomplished advocate. Cross-examination can be used to tell a "counter-story" to the one offered by the witness, to the factual elements of which the witness must agree, which can by contrasting selection, characterization, and sequencing of facts, offer a starkly different interpretation of events. And both cross and final arguments can be used in purely negative attack on the credibility of a witness and the persuasiveness of the interference that the opponent offers. This is as it should be. The trial proceeds by the construction and deconstruction of narrative. It is the crucible of democracy. A well-tried case can refine the
